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Abstract
The Encapsulation Plant, a part of the final disposal facility for spent fuel, will be located
at Olkiluoto, at location close to the Nuclear Power Station. The company engaged in the
final disposal in Finland has by now prepared a working report that describes the design
of the Encapsulation Plant with the level of details that makes possible the development
of a preliminary safeguards concept. The concept developed under this task is aimed at
enabling the IAEA to implement a cost-effective safeguards approach for this new type of
facility. Significant effort was invested by an informal team to understand the nature of
the IAEA integrated safeguards and, particularly, the role of Additional Protocol measures
in safeguarding the encapsulation process as part of the final disposal. A brief assessment
was made regarding the technical feasibility of the proposed safeguards concept. Also
consideration was given as to the further work required to for its application.
RAUTJÄRVI Juha (HCI Oy), TIITTA Antero, SAARINEN Johanna (VTT). Preliminary concept for
safeguarding spent fuel encapsulation plant in Olkiluoto, Finland. Phase III report on Task FIN A 1184
of the Finnish support program to IAEA Safeguards. STUK-YTO-TR 187. Helsinki 2002.
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The Finnish Support Programme Task FIN A 1184
concerning “Safeguards for Finnish Spent Fuel
Conditioning Plant” has through the work done
during the Phase I and II advanced to the point to
develop a preliminary safeguards concept.
Phase I of the Task provided information about
the back end of the fuel cycle in Finland including
interim storage, encapsulation plant and final
repository. Description of the preliminary design
of the encapsulation plant was provided [1]. The
results of Phase II were discussed in a workshop
in Helsinki, Finland, 12–20 December 2000 [2].
In the Annual Support Programme Review
Meeting, March 2001, it was agreed to develop the
preliminary safeguards concept as the Phase III
activity and to consider the Task thereby as com-
pleted. In subsequent discussion of the results co-
operation with the IAEA and the Euratom is very
important, particularly because no implementa-
tion experience has been gained yet of safeguard-
ing the final disposal of spent fuel.
The decision-making process on the final dis-
posal of spent fuel in the Finnish bedrock consist-
ed of several stages, with participation of the
citizens, municipalities and state authorities. Sev-
eral opportunities were given to become acquaint-
ed with various phases of the project and to
express opinions and articulate concerns. The gov-
ernmental and parliamentary policy level deci-
sions have been taken by May 2001. The final
disposal site has been selected and its location
identified close to the Olkiluoto NPP in Eurajoki.
The overall time schedule for the Operator’s
(Posiva Oy) disposal plan foresees now further
detailed site-specific investigations and design of
the site layout, including buildings and the rele-
vant services. Two optional locations in Olkiluoto
are considered. The encapsulation plant is at-
tached to the KPA-store or constructed as an
independent facility an adjacent site. The prelimi-
1 Introduction
nary design of the encapsulation plant itself is
available in the form of working reports [3], [4].
The one describing the Encapsulation Plant as an
independent facility is used here as primary refer-
ence. The results of the SAGOR activities are used
as further general reference.
The State of Finland, and particularly the
competent authorities, Ministry of Trade and In-
dustry and STUK responsible for safety and secu-
rity are obliged to present to the designer the
requirements that would appropriately cover also
those pertinent to safeguards. Further to this, the
development of the preliminary concept should
provide guidance as to the general design for the
overall safeguards system so that the needs of all
parties will be timely and appropriately ad-
dressed.
It is important to note that the application and
implementation of safeguards measures associat-
ed with the final disposal will begin already dur-
ing the planning and pre-operational phase. The
constructions of the rock characterization facility
and site confirmation investigations are planned
to commence already during 2004 and the con-
struction of the encapsulation plant is planned to
begin 2010. In order to ensure cost-effectiveness of
safeguards for the back end of the nuclear fuel
cycle timely engagement of all relevant parties in
design, planning, development of approaches,
methods and techniques is essential.
This report describes the preliminary safe-
guards concept for the Encapsulation Plant as
part of the final disposal of spent fuel. The concept
is aimed at enabling the IAEA to develop and
implement a cost-effective safeguards approach
for this new type of facility. The report reflects the
results of an informal team that worked in close
cooperation with the authority and the designer.
Significant effort was invested to understand the
nature of the IAEA integrated safeguards and,
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particularly, the role of Additional Protocol meas-
ures in safeguarding the encapsulation process as
part of the final disposal. It became evident that
safeguards of the encapsulation process will play
key role in the efforts to develop the required
management confidence that all spent fuel subject
to final disposal is accurately accounted for and
that the knowledge is maintained by all Parties in
a credible manner.
The concept developed under this support pro-
gram task is not intended to become a safeguards
approach and procedure that are the responsibili-
ty of the IAEA. It is also not about the procedures
that the Euratom may consider using in order to
satisfy its institutional requirements.
An annex is included to the report describing
the results of a brief assessment regarding the
technical feasibility of the described preliminary
safeguards concept and the further work that is
necessary to apply the proposed concept.
Before describing the final disposal and the
safeguards concept some basic assumptions are
elaborated. These include changing threat scenario
and its impact, the idea of integrated safeguards
and enhanced role of FIN-SSAC as well as areas
for increased co-operation in implementation.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 7
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2.1 Deterrence
The technical objective of safeguards is identified
in the comprehensive Safeguards Agreements [5]
as timely detection of diversion of significant
quantities of nuclear material, and deterrence of
such diversion by the risk of early detection.
Deterrence can be understood as an impact on
a State or any other actor contemplating to
conduct an unlawful act. It is a desired preventive
consequence of credible application of all available
measures and effective implementation of the
safeguards system functions.
Until early 90’s the purpose of safeguards, from
operational point of view, was the prevention of
diversion of the declared nuclear material from
declared facilities and activities. Implementation
effort was focused on accountancy verification of
declared nuclear material and use of containment
and surveillance measures to maintain the conti-
nuity of that knowledge. Administrative efficiency
was the desired goal of the organization activity.
IAEA safeguards was assessed by the Member
States to be able to meet this technical objective,
namely to verify the correctness of the declara-
tions.
The other ‘technical’ objective, namely the de-
terrence of diversion by the risk of early detection
was taken into account in establishing the ap-
proaches and in the implementation. It was an
element introduced into the system when assess-
ing the credibility of the approaches and develop-
ing the procedures for the accountancy verifica-
tion at declared facilities.
However, the deterrence may not have played
explicit enough role in negotiations, in establish-
ment of initial inventories and in establishing
routine operational activities as well as in analyz-
ing and evaluating information. The risk of early
detection of indications or indicators by the IAEA
of possible undeclared nuclear materials and ac-
2 Coping with changing threat
tivities was limited, in any case, very much de-
pendent of information from other States. The
completeness of the declarations was not assured
through operative activity.
In order to secure the credibility of the interna-
tional safeguards the completeness of the declara-
tions made by States must be ensured in addition
to verification of their correctness. Access to addi-
tional information and right of access to any place
at any time appeared necessary for the IAEA
safeguards system to be able to assure the com-
pleteness and full compliance with the terms of
the safeguards Agreement. The Additional Proto-
col to the Safeguards Agreement [6] offers legally
binding provisions to bring that effect.
Direct and prompt access to UN Security Coun-
cil is now available to cope timely with any possi-
ble non-compliance by a State with its Non-Prolif-
eration Treaty obligations. Further to this, Mem-
ber States of the IAEA are expected to co-operate
in good faith so as to ensure that the IAEA
safeguards will have required resources and be-
come truly cost-effective.
2.2 Security and safeguards
Since 11 of September 2001 also nuclear terrorism
shall be considered as a credible threat. Sub-na-
tional groups or individuals supported by interna-
tional networks may want, in an unpredictable
moment, to cause unacceptable and severe conse-
quences to human societies and to the environ-
ment. Society requires security relevance also
from safeguards.
The nature of the challenge is very different
from the one addressed during the cold war condi-
tions. The perceived adversary does not necessari-
ly have an address to contact, no clear frontlines
can be identified to confront, no assets to retaliate,
apparently no direct possibilities to influence the
motivations. The means and ways selected to cause
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mass destruction are mostly unpredictable.
National authorities in co-operation with inter-
national competent authorities are responsible for
security and must respond also to these kinds of
threats. The Non-Proliferation Treaty regime and
particularly the international IAEA safeguards
system supported by regional and national sys-
tems shall respond to this changing security envi-
ronment. Functional responsibilities shall be im-
plemented in a manner that confidence will be
built on credible grounds and that implementation
will have more direct relevance to security.
In Finland the non-proliferation safeguards has
always been considered as an important element
in confidence building and security. Data and in-
formation generated by different activity may
prove to have relevance in different context, safe-
ty, security or safeguards. Therefore, and in order
to ensure timely detection and action, co-operation
in implementation, analysis and evaluation of the
findings is essential. IAEA integrated safeguards
are expected to play increased role also for nation-
al security.
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3.1 General view to integrated
safeguards
IAEA, the Secretariat, is trusted by the Member
States to apply all available measures so that
there is credible assurance of the absence of unde-
clared nuclear activities and materials and of the
absence of diversion of declared nuclear material
from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or to
other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes un-
known.
Integrated safeguards can be understood as an
optimal combination of the accountancy verifica-
tion measures that are supported by containment
and surveillance and the complementary access
measures assuring the completeness of the infor-
mation provided, the absence of undeclared nucle-
ar materials and activities.
The IAEA carries out its inspections and com-
plementary activities as well as State-level analy-
sis and evaluations in order to draw conclusions
about compliance by Finland of its safeguards
obligations. These activities and assessments are
based on the declarations and clarifications pro-
vided by Finland and Euratom, as applicable, as
well as on the results of IAEA own activity and
information obtained from open sources and other
parties.
The IAEA will report the conclusions to its
Governing Bodies, to the Board of Governors and
to the General Conference. The IAEA keeps the
UN Security Council informed of the safeguards
situation and, in case further enforcement is re-
quired, provides also formal reports to the Securi-
ty Council.
The analysis and State evaluation is not limit-
ed to serve the purposes of annual reporting but is
a continuous process directing the ongoing imple-
mentation of the measures. IAEA safeguards need
to provide for early detection and timely respond.
This is an important characteristic when safe-
guarding a continuous process like the encapsula-
tion of spent fuel and its final disposal.
3.2 Additional protocol
Implementation of the ‘traditional’ safeguards
measures [5] and the analysis and evaluation ac-
tivities carried out by the IAEA has enabled it,
thus far, to draw conclusions that the nuclear ma-
terial placed by Finland under the IAEA safe-
guards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or
was otherwise adequately accounted for.
Finland, as all other States, are obliged to
notify all nuclear material subject to the IAEA
safeguards. However, the IAEA was not explicitly
required to ensure through any legally binding
particular procedures and operations that this
was really the case. Therefore the safeguards
operations and evaluations were focused to the
declared nuclear material only.
The Additional Protocol was adopted as a for-
mal part of the IAEA safeguards system in May
1997 [6]. When it is in force and adequately
implemented, it enables the Member States of
IAEA to assure that Finland has really placed all
nuclear material to IAEA safeguards. The Addi-
tional Protocol is expected to be in force in the
European Union, including Finland, by the end of
2002.
Within 180 days from the day of enforcement
Finland and the Euratom will provide IAEA with
the additional information. The IAEA will be then
in a position to begin with the implementation of
all measures of its strengthened system, including
those of the Additional Protocol.
The FIN-SSAC and the Euratom, respectively,
will provide timely the IAEA with the additional
information that is required by the Additional
Protocol about its nuclear program, including re-
lated R&D activities. Such information is given in
the form of the design information, the nuclear
3 Integrated safeguards implementation process
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material accountancy reports and other notifica-
tions informing about the nuclear activities at
facilities in Finland.
It is understood that during a reasonable peri-
od of time, about 2–3 years, the IAEA should be in
a position to draw conclusion that all nuclear
material subject to its strengthened safeguards
has been placed under safeguards by Finland and
that it remained in peaceful nuclear activities or
was otherwise adequately accounted for. This
would mean that latest by the year 2006 the
integrated IAEA safeguards could be in action in
Finland.
It is important to note that the information
provided by Finland and Euratom is taken as
declarations and are understood to be legally
binding. They form the basis for the IAEA to
implement its State-level approaches and to carry
out State evaluation activity to assess the compli-
ance of Finland with its obligations under the
Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Proto-
col. Successful conclusions are dependent on the
performance of all Parties, FIN-SSAC, Euratom,
IAEA and other States.
The complementary measures of the Additional
Protocol are expected to play central role in safe-
guarding the Encapsulation Plant as an integral
part of the final disposal of spent fuel in Finland.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 7
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Finland takes care of the safety, security, and eco-
nomical and social well-being of its citizens and
the environment. Finland participates in the in-
ternational society and has decided voluntarily to
limit its sovereignty by signing the Treaties, the
Safeguards Agreements and Protocols, thereby as-
signing particular functional responsibilities to in-
stitutions like the IAEA and those of the Europe-
an Union. Finland, however, has not delegated the
responsibility for confidence building and security.
Experience suggests that efficient and effective
co-operation in safeguards cannot be created only
on the basis of interpretations of the rights and
obligations that are assigned to the Parties. It is
understood that the genuine co-operation becomes
possible when the Parties will be clearly subordi-
nated to serve the co-operation process that is
aimed at facilitating to meet the objectives and to
serve the purposes of the integrated IAEA safe-
guards. The discussion in that case is focused on
the responsibility in safeguards implementation.
4.1 Role and functional responsibilities
of FIN-SSAC
4.1.1 General
During the 90’s, non-proliferation has become a
central security objective in the world. It is an
established Finnish policy to contribute to that
end in all areas. Finland has been a State party,
from the beginning, to the relevant treaties, nota-
bly Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biolog-
ical and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC) as
well as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT). Finland contributes to international ef-
forts in the area of the physical protection of nu-
clear facilities, transportation, materials and ac-
tivities.
Finland is an active participant in all export con-
trol regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG), the NPT Exporters Committee (Zangger
Committee), the Missile Technology Control Re-
gime (MTCR).
The Finnish State System of Accounting for
and Control of nuclear materials and activities
(FIN-SSAC) is an element in the national regime
and systems aimed at preventing proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
In the area of the use of nuclear materials and
conduct of nuclear activities in Finland the func-
tional responsibilities within the national system
are shared between by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry (MTI), the Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Authority (STUK) and the Operator of nuclear
activities.
MTI has the overall responsibility and particu-
lar functional responsibilities on various areas,
including the area of export control. STUK has the
primary responsibility for controlling the use of
nuclear materials in Finland. These authorities
are supported by the National Board of Customs
of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of
Defense and the Security Police.
4.1.2 STUK
STUK, as the competent authority, is assigned by
law [7] to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons
from nuclear materials and nuclear activities
within the territory of Finland, under its jurisdic-
tion or under its control anywhere. In this capaci-
ty STUK is:
• Ruling, regulating and exercising control on
the nuclear material activities in Finland. It is
required to maintain its independence and to
ensure through its own inspections that it
knows with required level of accuracy and
4 Roles and responsibilities in implementation
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certainty what is happening and may be ex-
pected to happen in its area of responsibility in
Finland;
• Enhancing the FIN-SSAC to respond to the
requirements of the strengthened internation-
al IAEA safeguards; to provide required decla-
rations and other findings so as to facilitate
verification and clarification inspections and
complementary access visits;
• Satisfying itself that the IAEA safeguards sys-
tem as applied and implemented in Finland is
providing for credible results and conclusions
about the full compliance of Finland with its
obligations under the Safeguards Agreement.
• Supporting, as required, the other Parties en-
gaged in the implementation of safeguards so
that they can carry out their functional respon-
sibilities efficiently and effectively.
4.1.3 Operator
Operators are responsible to keep STUK informed
about the nuclear materials and activities they are
using or know about. Operators are conducting
their business in a safe and physically secured
manner and in compliance with the safeguards
requirements. In its capacity the Operator is:
• Establishing and operating a nuclear material
accountancy and control system that with the
required level of accuracy keeps record on
nuclear materials and activities and provides
the required notifications, reports and other
information to the Parties responsible for the
verification function and other complementary
safeguards functions;
• Establishing and maintaining conditions that
are required to facilitate effective use of agreed
monitoring, containment and surveillance
measures;
• Facilitating access of IAEA designated inspec-
tors and other authorized personnel to places
within the facility and site to carry out their
functional responsibility;
• Facilitating, on its part, clarification of any
anomaly or inconsistency and shall respond to
questions that are relevant to safeguards, and
from its part;
• Ensuring that:
• the implementation of safeguards is not
hampering the economic and technological
development or international co-operation
in the field of peaceful nuclear activities;
• the health, safety, physical protection and
other security provisions as well as the
rights of individual are respected, and
that;
• every precaution is taken to protect com-
mercial, technological and industrial se-
crets.
One of the primary functions of FIN-SSAC is to
assure that all relevant findings are notified, de-
clared, reported or communicated otherwise to all
Parties who need to know within and out of Fin-
land. The quality of the findings and communica-
tions will be ensured so as to enable cost-effective-
ness in the performance of safeguards by Euratom
and IAEA functions. The relationships within the
FIN-SSAC are such that the required independ-
ence of the competent authority is not at risk.
The FIN-SSAC provides a process and infra-
structure that enables the competent authority
STUK and the licensee, the Operator, to carry out
their particular functional responsibilities effi-
ciently and effectively. Consistent with the objec-
tives and quality policy the functional responsibil-
ities include those aimed at:
• ensuring conditions that at the sites, facilities
and in Finland as a whole efficient and effec-
tive implementation of safeguards is possible;
• generating and communicating authentic, ac-
curate, secured data and information;
• ensuring correspondence with the reality of the
generated data and information (verification
function) and coherence with the results and
conclusions obtained (clarification function);
• facilitating knowledge creation and consequent
decision-making and decisive action.
In addition to the above operative responsibilities
the FIN-SSAC functions include measures that
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 7
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are:
• ensuring clarity in the implementation respon-
sibilities;
• providing for an adequate technological and
administrative infrastructure;
• ensuring ongoing learning and improvement of
resource competencies and skills;
• ensuring ongoing improvement in administra-
tive efficiency and effectiveness.
4.2 Co-operation of FIN-SSAC, IAEA
and Euratom
All Parties are obliged to ensure cost-effectiveness,
to keep the frequency and intensity of activities to
the minimum consistent with the objectives of
safeguards. This implies that the functions of the
Parties are well defined and coherent with their
roles in the integrated safeguards implementation
process. Such clarity makes it possible to identify
and allocate the required resources and to ensure
effective co-operation in implementation.
It is understood that each Party shall be able to
draw its conclusions independently on the basis of
premises established by it or otherwise secured by
it. And that they shall be able to do it in a credible
manner, without a high risk of bringing an evi-
dence of non-objectivity or that of incompetence.
The FIN-SSAC has the technical capabilities,
experience and established structures, processes
and practices that warrant extensive co-operation
in implementation, development and training.
Enhanced co-operation in safeguarding the En-
capsulation Plant is possible. The relationships,
roles and responsibilities of the Parties in inte-
grated safeguards implementation are schemati-
cally described in Figure 1.
Further to that it is understood that the IAEA
criteria shall be met in all applicable cases. How-
ever, should there be a need for Euratom to
perform an additional activity in order satisfy its
other institutional obligations, such situations
would be addressed appropriately but separately.
Figure 1. Roles and functional responsibilities of the Parties in implementation of the integrated IAEA
safeguards.
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Co-operation between the Parties could extend to
the following areas:
1. Development and testing of implementation
approaches, procedures and practices;
2. Development of sampling plans, calibration and
measurement procedures;
3. Development of information technological in-
terface and communication protocols and pro-
cedures that would facilitate authenticated
data and information collection and secured
transfer;
4. Performance of NDA and in-field DA measure-
ments using common equipment;
5. Shared use of the SSAC workstations and labo-
ratories, including joint assessment and evalu-
ation of data and information in order to assure
the quality of obtained data and information;
6. Use of monitoring equipment, seals and sur-
veillance;
7. Conduct particular inspection activities – How-
ever, not complete inspections so as not to risk
the possibility to draw conclusions independ-
ently;
8. Shared procurement of safeguards equipment;
9. Use of training facilities equipment, material
and programs.
The co-operation between the Parties shall be ap-
proached pragmatically and discussed as a practi-
cal matter keeping the roles of the Parties in mind
and the objectives and purposes of safeguards in
sight.
In addition, the IAEA could use inspection data
and information generated by the FIN-SSAC and/
or the Euratom as part of the premises that the
IAEA is using to draw its independent conclu-
sions. Such data and information are hereby un-
derstood to mean the ‘findings’ of the SSAC and of
the Euratom. It is important to note that Finland
and the Euratom have established understanding
about the communications with the IAEA and
about the mutual exchange of data and informa-
tion so as to ensure co-ordination.
The condition for the IAEA to use efficiently
the services is that the FIN-SSAC and/or the
Euratom are capable to produce technically valid
results and that it is proven by the IAEA that such
results are produced by a competent personnel
and in conformity with the principles and estab-
lished procedures.
4.3 Role of Euratom in integrated
IAEA safeguards
The Euratom plays an instrumental role and
carries out particular functional responsibilities
aimed at facilitating cost-effective application of
the measures and implementation of the functions
of the IAEA integrated safeguards system. These
particular functional responsibilities and services
shall be defined in the enhanced New Partnership
Agreement, to be agreed upon.
4.4 Role of IAEA
The IAEA is responsible to ensure cost-effective
application of all available measures and imple-
mentation of the system functions by the Parties.
The IAEA is to verify the compliance of Finland
with its obligations under the safeguards Agree-
ments, including those of the Additional Protocol.
The IAEA is responsible to perform its inde-
pendent clarification and verification work, analy-
sis and evaluation effort as well as reporting
functions so that there is credible assurance of the
absence of undeclared nuclear activities and mate-
rials, and the absence of diversion of declared
nuclear material in Finland.
The IAEA shall carry out its clarification and
verification activities and draw its conclusions in a
timely manner so as to facilitate the implementa-
tion of integrated safeguards in Finland, thus
facilitating the Member States of the IAEA to
assess adequacy of the assurances provided by the
IAEA safeguards. In case the IAEA is unable to
draw confirmative conclusions it is expected to
report to its governing bodies and, as appropriate,
to the UN Security Council.
In the implementation of safeguards the IAEA
shall take into account the need to:
• avoid hampering the economic and technologi-
cal development or international co-operation
in the field of peaceful nuclear activities;
• respect health, safety, physical protection and
other security provisions as well as the rights
of individual, and ;
• take every precaution to protect commercial,
technological and industrial secrets.
In addition, in safeguarding a continuous spent
fuel encapsulation process followed by the final
disposal, after which nuclear material will be no
more accessible for re-verification, timely perform-
ance is of particular importance.
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5.1 General description
There are two nuclear power utilities in Finland
at present. The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant con-
sists of two BWR reactors, whereas the Loviisa
nuclear power plant has two reactors of VVER 440
type. In addition, the VTT has a research reactor,
FiR 1, of Triga Mk II type in Espoo.
Approximately 75 tonnes of spent fuel are
annually removed from the reactors of the Olkiluo-
to and Loviisa NPPs and stored in wet storage
facilities at the power plants. A total inventory of
some 2600 tonnes of spent fuel will accumulate
during the projected 40 years of operation of the
Finnish reactor units.
In May 1999, Posiva, the company engaged in
the final disposal submitted an application for a
decision–in–principle to the State Council about
the siting of the final repository near the Olkiluoto
power plant in Eurajoki. The decision–in–princi-
ple on the location of the final repository was
made by the end of 2000. This was followed by
ratification of the Parliament in May 2001. De-
tailed investigations will be performed in 2000–
2010 and the construction of the encapsulation
plant will take place in 2010–2020. The disposal of
spent fuel will start in 2020.
5.2 Time schedule
The design of the encapsulation plant is underway
and expected to be available by the end of 2003.
An indicative time schedule is given in Figure 2.
Construction of the “Onkalo”, an underground
rock characterization facility aimed at site confir-
mation investigations, will start at Olkiluoto site
by 2004. Note may be taken that the encapsula-
tion and the transfer of the canisters into the final
underground repository are planned to be a con-
tinuous process. The “Onkalo” can be expected to
form a part of the final repository. Therefore a
submission of the formal Design Information to
IAEA as early as 2004 is desirable.
The following generic activities are required in
order to develop and implement cost-effective and
efficient safeguards at the conditioning plant: In-
5 Description of final disposal in Finland
Figure 2. Overall schedule of the Finnish final disposal project and timing of the work.
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troduction of safeguards relevant aspects into the
design of the encapsulation plant;
1. Development of general regulatory require-
ments;
2. Identification and development of the meas-
urement methods and techniques for the meas-
urement station;
3. Identification and initiation of the develop-
ment of reliable monitoring, containment and
surveillance systems;
4. Identification and initiation of the develop-
ment of the information and communication
technological requirements, infrastructure and
software tools;
5. Generation of the Technical Characteristics and
the Design Information to the Euratom and the
IAEA;
6. Development by IAEA of the safeguards ap-
proach, including identification of functional
specifications and technical requirements;
7. Development and negotiation of the co-opera-
tion arrangements, communication and other
procedures;
8. Provision of final design information, including
the site definition, interim storage design, con-
ditioning plant design and repository design.
Experience has shown that the development of
reliable instrumentation for safeguards requires
time. It is advisable to identify the technological
options, as early as possible, and to continue with
the development keeping in sight the date such
equipment will be used.
5.3 Disposal process
The final disposal facility, including the encapsu-
lation plant and the final repository of spent fuel,
will be located at Olkiluoto. In this safeguards con-
cept development, the reference encapsulation
plant is an independent facility on the final dis-
posal site. The plant will receive spent fuel in
casks from both nuclear power plants, Olkiluoto
and Loviisa.
The elements of the fuel cycle that are used as
a basis for the development of this safeguards
concept are schematically described below in Fig-
ure 3.
5.3.1 Shipping facilities
The spent fuel assemblies are stored in the reactor
building for 1–3 years before they are transferred
to the interim wet storage located at the nuclear
power plant. Spent fuel is allowed to cool down for
Figure 3. A schematic description of the final disposal of spent fuel from Olkiluoto NPP and Loviisa
NPP in Finland.
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20–40 years in the interim storage. The cooling is
required to facilitate the encapsulation and final
disposal process and for fulfilling the temperature
and thermal-power generation limitations set
forth to the canister for safety reasons.
The first operation to start the disposal process
is the transfer of spent fuel assemblies from the
interim wet storage to a wet characterization and
verification station. This area provides for:
• Storage positions for spent fuel assemblies sub-
ject to shipment for final disposal;
• Characterization and verification station for
final measurements of the spent fuel assem-
blies and other nuclear material containing
items, if any;
• Buffer storage for spent fuel assemblies that
have been characterized and verified and sub-
ject to clearance by the safeguarding authori-
ties;
• Buffer storage for those assemblies, which have
not passed the verification measurement;
• Shipping area to prepare for the transportation
to the conditioning plant.
The spent fuel assemblies, storage and shipping
containers at the shipping facilities, the Nuclear
Power Stations at Loviisa and Olkiluoto, are sub-
ject to IAEA conventional nuclear material ac-
countancy verification measures, including the use
of containment and surveillance measures.
In this concept, the safeguards responsibility
will be transferred to Posiva upon shipment of the
spent fuel from these facilities to the encapsula-
tion plant.
5.3.2 Shipment to encapsulation plant
Fuel transport from the interim stores of the nu-
clear power stations to the encapsulation pant will
take place in the Castor type casks.
The capacity of the casks used by the Olkiluoto
NPP is 50 BWR fuel assemblies. The plan is to use
only 48 being a multiple of 12 that is the capacity
of a single fuel canister. The casks filled with
water and fuel are transported with the existing
trailer to the encapsulation plant that locates
within the private industrial area.
From the Loviisa plant, the fuel is transported
in CASTOR VVER-440 type casks, which has ca-
pacity of 84 PWR fuel assemblies. The casks filled
with water and fuel are transported to the encap-
sulation either by sea, by train or by truck, or with
any combination of these. The fuel is transported,
most frequently, once a month in two casks. Also,
existing transport casks for 30 fuel assemblies
may be used. The type of the cask used will be
decided before the final design of the encapsula-
tion plant.
5.3.3 Encapsulation process
In the encapsulation plant, the spent fuel is re-
ceived and treated for final disposal. In the hot
cell, the spent fuel assemblies are unloaded from
the spent fuel transport casks, dried in an auto-
clave and loaded into the final disposal canisters.
The gas atmosphere of the disposal canister is
changed, the inner lid is closed, and the electron
beam welding method is used to close the lid of the
outer copper canister. The final disposal canisters
are cleaned and transferred into the buffer store
after the machining and inspection of the copper
lid welds. From the buffer store, the final disposal
canisters are transferred into the final repository
vaults by the canister lift. All needed operations
are performed safely and without any activity re-
leases. The encapsulation operation is planned to
be a continuous one.
The preliminary design of the spent fuel condi-
tioning plant includes the following areas:
• Spent fuel receiving and storage area;
• Transfer corridor of the canisters;
• Spent fuel handling cell where fuel is placed in
canisters;
• Welding station where the copper lid is welded;
• Inspection corridor and places for decontami-
nation and unique identification of the canis-
ter;
• Buffer storage for 12 canisters ready for final
disposal;
• Lift to lower canister down to the underground
repository.
More information about the preliminary design of
the encapsulation plant and process is provided in
the Phase I report to this Task [1] and, particular-
ly, in report [3].
The planned operational capacity of the plant
is 60 canisters per year. The conditioning plant
capacity can be raised to 100 canisters in a year if
18
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needed. This means that the plant will produce up
to 2 canisters per one week containing 24 spent
fuel assemblies.
5.3.4 Transfer to final repository
The fuel canister will be transferred in vertical
position from the canister buffer store onto the
canister lift trolley. The weight of the canister is
about 25 tons and the weight of the trolley is about
5 tons totaling 30 tons.
The canister lift trolley is driven in the lift car
with the fuel canister on it. At the final repository
level, the canister is driven out to the canister
docking station, where canister transfer vehicle
can pick up the fuel canister.
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 8 7
19
6.1 Objectives
The goals to guide the concept development are
defined as following the results of the SAGOR
work [8]. The implementation of safeguards sys-
tem functions and associated evaluations shall
provide credible assurance to all Parties engaged
in the implementation that:
1. Diversion of spent fuel rods, assemblies, casks
and canisters is not accomplished without ear-
ly detection of indications or indicators of such
diversion;
2. Spent fuel subject to final disposal is well
characterized, accounted for and tracked;
3. Facilities, including reactors, encapsulation
plant and final repository are operated as de-
signed and declared;
4. Data and information generated is disseminat-
ed to the Parties who need to know, and stored
in a secure way;
5. Knowledge created by the Parties, including
the judgement and decisions taken, are main-
tained, and stored in a secure way;
6. Interference with the encapsulation plant oper-
ations is minimized;
7. Presence, frequency and intensity of the
Euratom and IAEA activities at the encapsula-
tion plant are kept to the minimum consistent
with the objective of cost-effective safeguards.
The first goal relates directly to the technical ob-
jective of IAEA safeguards, to the timely detection
of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear ma-
terial and to the deterrence of such diversion by
the risk of early detection.
The following three goals refer to the imple-
mentation strategy that emphasizes the impor-
tance of correct and accurate data and information
as well as verification that leaves no doubt among
the Parties about the nuclear material content,
number and identity of items. The fifth point
emphasizes knowledge creation, timely analysis
and evaluation of the results and findings as well
as importance of consequent judgement by the
responsible Parties and their decision-making.
The last two points refer to the cost-effective
operation of the encapsulation plant, to the co-
operation in implementation and to the effective
and efficient application of all measures available
to IAEA safeguards.
6.2 Special features
The following specific features are taken into ac-
count while developing the preliminary concept
for the Encapsulation Plant at Olkiluoto:
• Physical layout and processes are transparent,
accessible for visual observation and instru-
mental presence to observe and monitor the
flow of action, items and areas of interest to
safeguards.
• Scheduling of activities and timing of commu-
nications, including findings of the FIN-SSAC
and the Euratom, respectively, will permit coor-
dinated conduct of the Parties in their func-
tional responsibilities.
• Canisters produced in the encapsulation can be
identified on the basis of unique number that
will be difficult to falsify. The unique identifica-
tion e.g. by use of patterns created in welding
the lid may prove to be ineffective. Sealing of
the inner lid could be considered.
• Process will be so structured that the encapsu-
lation of spent fuel assemblies can continue
without interruption. Should any irregularity
be identified during the quality control actions
pertinent to the process, corrective actions will
be so organized that the maintenance of the
continuity of knowledge is assured.
6 Safeguards concept development
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• Fuel assemblies become difficult to access when
they are placed in a disposal canister. Once
closed and sealed, canisters shall not be reo-
pened for re-verification of their nuclear mate-
rial content. Reopening is technically possible.
For safety and security reasons, reopening of
canisters cannot be excluded. When spent fuel
is emplaced in the repository, it will no longer
be accessible for direct safeguards verification.
• Results of the earlier verification measures and
the evidence of the successful maintenance of
the continuity of knowledge shall be made
available to provide for credible assurance that
the spent fuel assemblies and other material
subject to encapsulation and transfer to final
repository is as declared.
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7.1 Conditions
The following conditions are assumed and taken
into account when developing the safeguards con-
cept for the encapsulation plant in Olkiluoto:
1. The spent fuel assemblies received at the en-
capsulation plant are characterized, accounted
for and verified at the wet interim storage
prior to shipment to the plant.
2. The encapsulation plant is considered as a
‘book inventory area’ for the material balance
accountancy purposes. The nuclear material is
not made routinely available for re-verification.
The nuclear material inventory at any given
time is established through monitoring the
material flows and through measures to main-
tain the knowledge.
3. Physical layout of the conditioning plant will
be transparent. The design of the plant, its
layout and processes are such that visual, hu-
man observation and instrumental monitoring
are facilitated. Other required access can be
managed through particular procedure that
will be agreed in advance.
4. Timing of nuclear material handling and other
services as well as the verification and clarifi-
cation activities of those engaged in safeguards
implementation are organized in a way that
the encapsulation of spent fuel assemblies can
be carried out as a continuous process.
5. Documentation and communication systems
ensure that authentic information about iden-
tity of items subject to safeguards, their nucle-
ar material content and other operational and
circumstantial information relevant to safe-
guards are made timely available to all Parties
responsible for safety, safeguards and security
and, as appropriate, to those responsible of
societal functions.
6. Institutional presence in the form of periodic
inspections, unannounced inspections and com-
plementary access and design information re-
view visits will play major role in verification of
the declared operations and in assuring the
absence of any undeclared nuclear activities
and materials. Services and processes will be
scheduled so that adequate time will be made
available for the organizations to carry out
their activities appropriately.
7. Establishment and maintenance of a compre-
hensive and correct database, a coherent set of
information and creation and maintenance of a
knowledge base relevant to safeguarding the
final disposal is of fundamental importance for
all Parties engaged in the implementation. The
institutional conclusions will be based on the
documented up–to–date, well-maintained data-
, information and knowledge bases.
8 Maintenance of the continuity of knowledge is
not limited to that associated traditionally with
the use of seals and surveillance on items or
areas containing nuclear material subject to
safeguards. Knowledge to be maintained in
institutional memories includes all safeguards
relevant data and information and their use as
premises, as factual or circumstantial evidenc-
es, in the argumentation aimed at drawing
conclusions and deciding follow-up actions.
9. Parties implementing safeguards system func-
tions are willing, able and capable to analyze
and evaluate timely the results of their activi-
ties and all other information so as to make it
possible to draw the conclusions and communi-
cate these in timely manner.
7 Preliminary safeguards concept
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10.In case satisfactory clarifications cannot be
obtained without re-verification of the nuclear
material content of the assembly or that of the
canister, these will be returned back to a posi-
tion where the required reassurances can be
obtained. After such a case a review will be
carried out to understand why the Parties
could not implement their responsibilities in a
timely and effective manner. Such considera-
tion shall also address the responsibilities asso-
ciated with the additional costs and other con-
sequences.
7.2 Measurement station
Measurement for the characterization and verifi-
cation of all spent fuel subject to encapsulation
and transfer to the final repository is the corner-
stone of the final disposal safeguards system. It is
suggested that this measurement should take
place already in the nuclear power plants, in their
wet interim storage facilities.
It is important that the final verification of
nuclear material is carried out in good time before
the assembly goes into the encapsulation phase.
When required, the safeguards authorities would
have time to respond to the verification results or
results of any complementary activities before the
assemblies are subjected to encapsulation into the
final disposal canister.
Should there be a bigger problem at one of the
supplying sites the process could be switched into
conditioning of spent fuel from the other supply-
ing nuclear power plant. This possibility would
facilitate the continuous operation of the condi-
tioning plant on one hand and the clarification of
the open issues on the other hand.
Especially maintenance operations of the veri-
fication station or a finding of an irregular case
would not interrupt the whole conditioning and
disposal process. This would save time and facili-
tate the maintenance of cost-effectiveness of the
disposal process.
The measurement should be capable to rod
level verification. This means that the measure-
ment should be able to distinguish dummy assem-
blies from spent fuel and, additionally, all dummy
or missing rods should be detected in a spent fuel
assembly. On the present state–of–the–art level of
NDA measurement technology only the Passive
High-Energy Gamma Emission Tomography
(PHEGET) can comply with this requirement.
Further development of the method is required,
however.
After the characterization and verification of
spent fuel assemblies the primary function of the
safeguards system is to maintain the continuity of
knowledge; generate and document the relevant
data and information as well as create the knowl-
edge required for the decision making about com-
pliance.
The assemblies that have been characterized
and verified by all Parties as a joint activity shall
stay about one month in the buffer storage allow-
ing time for institutional evaluation and decision
making—spent fuel assemblies are ready for
transport and waiting for institutional clearances.
Upon receipt of the clearances the assemblies
in that batch are released for transportation to the
conditioning plant. The safeguards responsibility
will be transferred from the Nuclear Power Plants
to Posiva, which is the company responsible for
the final disposal.
7.3 Shipment to encapsulation plant
During the shipment, transportation and receipt
at the encapsulation plant appropriate human and
instrumental presence of the Parties is ensured by
optimal combination of inspections, complementa-
ry access visits and use of monitoring, contain-
ment and surveillance measures.
The transport casks are sealed and maintained
under continuous surveillance and monitoring re-
garding their condition and location. Transports
are conducted under instrumental monitoring and
institutional observation. Technical means and
communication technology to monitor the ship-
ments is understood to exist and to be in routine
use.
The shipments will be scheduled so that cost-
effective conduct becomes possible. The SSAC per-
sonnel are present and inspectors from Euratom
and the IAEA may decide to verify the operations,
and to carry out inspections and complementary
access activities.
7.4 Encapsulation process
Encapsulation is a continuous process beginning
with the receipt of the spent fuel transport and
storage container and ending with the shipment of
the disposal canisters by a lift down to the final
repository.
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7.4.1 Receipt and handling
Spent fuel arrives at the conditioning facility in
casks under seals and surveillance. Operator of
the Encapsulation Plant accepts the receipt of the
spent fuel assemblies on the basis of the shipper’s
values. The spent fuel received at the Plant would
be placed in the buffer store for received spent fuel
casks.
The spent fuel cask is prepared for docking and
moved on rails to the docking station under the
hot cell. Two separate docking stations are availa-
ble for the different types of transport casks. The
cask is sealed into the hot cell docking penetra-
tion. The internal covering hatch of the hot cell is
opened, and the radiation protection lid of the
spent fuel cask is lifted inside the hot cell. The fuel
assemblies will be lifted one by one with the fuel-
handling machine into the autoclave for drying.
The operation is monitored by camera.
7.4.2 Loading of the spent fuel canister
in the hot cell
A new, empty canister is, in principle, received,
stored and prepared in the same way as the spent
fuel transport cask. Each canister, cast iron insert
and lid has a unique ID number stamped. For
reading the ID numbers the hot cell has cameras
connected to a computer equipped with character
recognition software. The computer has the access
to the accountancy data base for registering the
ID numbers of the canisters, lids and every fuel
assembly.
The knowledge base provides access to the
required information about the nuclear material
content and other required characteristics, includ-
ing those pertinent to safety.
The operations in the hot cell are monitored
and documented by the camera, including the
closing of the inner lid of the fuel canister.
Leaking assemblies are special cases, and their
capsules are not opened at the Conditioning Plant.
The capsules containing a leaking fuel assembly
will be handled in the same way as the fuel
assemblies themselves. Specially designed canis-
ters will be manufactured for these capsules. An
infrequent special campaign is envisaged for these
operations.
Provision for the fuel assembly measurement is
embedded in the floor of the hot cell like the
autoclaves. It is shielded from the radiation of the
open spent fuel cask and other sources so that
accurate measurements can be carried out when
required. Note should be taken that the current
design does not foresee any routine nuclear mate-
rial verification in the hot cell. Therefore no in-
stalled measurement instrumentation is foreseen
either in the current design or in this safeguards
concept.
Fuel assemblies could be diverted from the hot
cell through the ceiling trap door into the decon-
tamination area. In addition to the visual access
and camera monitoring of the hot cell operations,
the radiation monitoring of the hot cell ceiling
trap door is required.
7.4.3 Closing of the canister and quality
control inspections
After tightening the inner lid and testing its tight-
ness, the canister will be moved to the transfer
corridor. The ID number of the copper lid is regis-
tered and the lid is installed. This operation is
carried out under camera surveillance.
The canister is moved to the electron beam
welding. After welding the seam is machined and
the weld inspected by ultrasound and by X-ray.
The welding operation can be visually monitored
through a lead glass and by camera that is in-
stalled in the vacuum chamber. An X-ray inspec-
tion produces a unique image of the welded seam
of the canister, and it may be used as a “finger-
print” identifier, which can be registered and saved
in the accountancy data base. Further research is
required, however.
7.4.4 Canister disassembly in case of
rejected welds
If the canister does not pass the quality inspec-
tion, it will be returned to the welding station for
repair of the weld. If the weld cannot be repaired,
the canister will be returned to the encapsulation
line and the weld will be removed by cutting. The
canister will be connected to the docking station of
the hot cell and the fuel removed.
After removing the fuel assemblies, the canis-
ter can be used as a waste package for high active
waste. The outer copper lid can be recycled. The
opening and rejection of the canister and the
removal of the fuel are registered in the account-
ancy data base, after which a new canister is
introduced and the removed fuel batch is loaded
into as described in Sec. 7.4.2.
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7.4.5 Handling of new canisters in hot cell
A new canister is brought to the encapsulation by
truck. In the Encapsulation Plant, the canister is
lifted by crane from the truck and lowered into the
canister transfer corridor with its supporting
frame. The canister is then positioned on a re-
mote-controlled track-wheeled transfer trolley. All
canister fittings are transported together with the
canister. The support is returned back to the work-
shop.
When the new canister is loaded onto the
trolley, the operating personnel can be in situ for
the manual operations and controls.
A canister on a trolley, also the one loaded with
the spent fuel, can be taken out from the transfer
corridor by the use of the canister lift. Therefore,
for safeguards purposes, radiation monitoring is
required at the lift entrance door.
7.5 Handling of ready fuel canisters
7.5.1 Transfer into the buffer store
After the canister has passed inspections, the ac-
cepted canisters will be transferred into the canis-
ter buffer store for waiting to be transferred into
the final repository. The cost-effective operation of
the Plant does not foresee any static inventory in
the buffer store. Should there be a need, for safe-
guards purposes, to operate in a batch mode it will
have cost implications. Therefore possibility to im-
plement safeguards adequately on the continuous
process must be further studied with care.
7.5.2 Transfer to repository
In case the Encapsulation Plant is attached to the
Olkiluoto KPA store, the loaded fuel canister is
transported to the entrance building of the final
repository on the road about 2 km, like any spent
fuel containers. Equal safeguards provisions would
be applicable to such transfers. The operations in
the entrance building housing the lift to final re-
pository are expected to be similar to those for
case where the Encapsulation Plant is an inde-
pendent facility.
In case the Encapsulation Plant is an inde-
pendent facility, the fuel canister will be trans-
ferred in vertical position through a labyrinth
from the buffer store onto the canister lift trolley.
The canister is moved by the trolley to the lift that
takes it to the underground repository.
The canister ID number is read by the camera
and registered into the accountancy data base,
when the fuel canister is transferred from the
buffer store to the canister lift. The radiation level
in the lift entrance room is measured, when the
canister is loaded onto the canister transfer trol-
ley.
The payload of the canister lift including the
lift car is minimized. The weight of the fuel canis-
ter is about 25 tons and the weight of the trolley
about 5 tons totaling 30 tons. Possible role of
weight monitoring in safeguards by use of load-
cells could be studied.
At the final repository level, the canister is
driven out to the canister docking station, where
the canister transfer vehicle will pick up the fuel
canister.
7.6 Process monitoring and control
The monitoring and control activities can be divid-
ed into production control, process control, safe-
guards monitoring, radiation monitoring, release
monitoring and access control.
It is understood that the production and proc-
ess monitoring and control activities can be used
to serve safeguards purpose, particularly to facili-
tate complementary measures that are aimed at
verifying the declared operations and detection of
any undeclared nuclear materials and activities.
The production and process control activities are
primarily serving radiation and nuclear safety or
security and societal purposes. The possible role in
safeguards of the following should be studied more
carefully.
• The use of the Encapsulation Plant control
room functions and recordings also for the
safeguards monitoring.
• The role of the process control corridor provid-
ing visual access to the hot cell and canister
transfer corridor.
• Use of the ventilation system to monitor the
atmospheric environment for safeguards pur-
poses. The exhaust air activity is monitored
continuously.
• Monitoring of the direct radiation continuously
and on need to know basis. Monitoring of the
contamination levels of various premises and
materials.
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• Monitoring the material transfers from the hot
cell to the decontamination and the work in the
area of decontamination.
• The bentonite block production is not super-
vised from the control room. However, the per-
sonnel transfers the blocks to the canister lift,
which transfers them to the final repository.
The operation is interfering with the handling
of the canisters.
• Use of hot cell manipulators for collecting envi-
ronmental samples for safeguards purposes.
• Use of the drainage water system for collecting
environmental samples for safeguards purpos-
es.
• Active waste produced by the encapsulation
and decontamination will be stored in the final
repository, in the cavern close to the canister
shaft bottom. The canister lift will be used and
the operation is interfering with the handling
of the canisters.
The above activities are of interest to safeguards
particularly when considering the complementary
access regime aimed at assuring that no unde-
clared nuclear activities and materials are present
at any given time within the site and facilities
associated with the encapsulation and final repos-
itory of spent fuel. Therefore it may be prudent to
connect the automatic process control and radia-
tion monitoring systems into the accountancy data
base for registering all significant or exceptional
events detected by the process control or radiation
monitoring systems.
It is understood that, due to the accessible
process design and continuous well-defined and
clean production, the process and production con-
trol activities could play a significant role in
safeguards implementation and in its cost-effec-
tiveness.
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The planning, site characterization investigations
and the design of the final disposal facilities, in-
cluding the Encapsulation Plant and the final un-
derground repository, have advanced to the point
where also safeguards requirements shall be con-
sidered.
The Operator, Posiva Oy, has made available
documents [4] and [5] describing the encapsula-
tion process, the buildings and the relevant servic-
es. During the year 2004, the Operator is planning
to begin with the construction of the first under-
ground site investigation shafts and galleries,
which probably will form a part of the final reposi-
tory. The authorities responsible for regulatory
control, including safeguards, are invited to con-
tribute to the design of these processes and facili-
ties.
The preliminary safeguards concept developed
under this Support Programme task for the En-
capsulation Plant is based on the above referred
documents and the assumption that integrated
safeguards will be implemented in Finland in 2–3
years. The general experience gained in imple-
menting IAEA strengthened safeguards measures
suggests that the optimal use of all measures
available to the IAEA system, including those of
the Additional Protocol, is possible and that effec-
tive safeguards can be implemented by the Parties
in Finland. Enhanced role of the Finnish national
safeguards system and improved cooperation be-
tween the IAEA and Euratom is expected to
ensure the cost-effectiveness.
The proposed safeguards concept is based on
requirement that the encapsulation will be a con-
tinuous, clean and transparent process. In which
only well-characterized and previously verified
items will be handled. The final accountancy veri-
fication of spent fuel assemblies should take place
at the shipping facilities. No nuclear material
verification measurements are planned to take
place at the Encapsulation Plant. However, a
structural provision for the NDA measurements
in the hot cell will be prepared. This means that
the continuity of knowledge will play a central and
particular role in the development of safeguards
conclusions and maintenance of the management
confidence about full compliance with the safe-
guards agreement obligations. Authentic meas-
urement results and other findings during stor-
age, transportation and handling will be made
timely available by FIN-SSAC through secure
communications to all Parties who need to know.
The continuity of knowledge about the identity
and content of the spent fuel in the assemblies and
of the canisters to be disposed will be maintained.
Optimum combination of inspections, use of moni-
toring, containment and surveillance technology
as well as complementary access and DIV visits
will make it possible for the Parties to draw their
respective conclusions with confidence.
It is suggested that the concept is technically
feasible and can be implemented with the coopera-
tion of all parties. However, as suggested in the
attached ANNEX, further research and develop-
ment effort is required in order to apply the
proposed concept. This effort includes identifica-
tion of the measurement and monitoring technolo-
gy and its further development to support the
application.
The proposed safeguards concept means a chal-
lenge to the organizations, to their analysis and
evaluation processes as well as to the knowledge
creation, the decision making and follow-up ac-
tion. In order to support an effective instrumental
presence and institutional access, appropriate in-
formation and communication technology shall be
identified and application developed. Further de-
velopment in the area of the cooperation arrange-
ments and implementation procedures is also re-
quired.
8 Conclusions
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State-level evaluation of the compliance is the un-
dertaking of the IAEA. Emphasis is by now at
establishment and maintenance of conditions that
enable it to draw credible conclusions of the ab-
sence of undeclared nuclear activities and materi-
als and of the absence of diversion of declared
nuclear materials. Cost-effectiveness of that sys-
tem rests upon a reliable and effective national
system that is capable to provide timely, correct
and complete declarations and able to respond to
any questions that may arise in implementation.
The Euratom system is expected to provide its
contributions timely to the system implementa-
tion, and as agreed.
The security is based on knowledge, informa-
tion and data is not enough. The national system,
on one hand, generates and disseminates, through
secure channels, the required information and
data to parties who need to know. On the other
hand, it maintains the knowledge base that trans-
parently and coherently represents all nuclear
activities and materials associated with the final
disposal of spent fuel in the Finnish bedrock—
thus enabling effective implementation of the
IAEA safeguards also for the back end of the fuel
cycle in Finland.
The concept described shall be subject to a
critical consideration by all Parties. The objective
of such considerations is to define the research
and development needs and to find out ultimately
optimal ways and means to implement safeguards
at the final disposal of the spent fuel in Finland
cost-effectively. As a result the IAEA should be
able to conclude, in a timely and credible manner,
about the full compliance by Finland with the
Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol.
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1 Safety and safeguards requirements
In order to meet both safety and safeguards objec-
tives accurate information must be available on
need–to–know basis about the nuclear material,
including information about identities of items and
quantities of the nuclear material handled in the
disposal process. The disposal process is schemati-
cally depicted in Figure A-1.
The amount and flow of nuclear material has to
be controlled in the viewpoint of both safety and
safeguards. The amount of fissile material has to
be controlled to ensure criticality safety. The trans-
fer casks, storages, handling devices and disposal
canisters of spent fuel assemblies have to be
designed in a way to prevent critical fuel concen-
trations in all situations. [1, 2]
The total thermal load of a disposal canister is
restricted because the temperature of the ben-
tonite buffer in the repository has to be kept under
100°C to ensure its chemical stability. The opti-
mum assembly combination in each disposal can-
ister can be achieved by mixing assemblies with
cooling time about 40 years and assemblies with
cooling time about 20 years. [3] The radiation dose
rate outside the disposal canister has to be mini-
mized. Because of that, the assemblies with high
burnup should be placed into the central positions
in the disposal canister. The restricted thermal
load of the disposal canister and the minimization
requirement of the radiation dose rate outside the
canister set limits regarding the set of assemblies
to be disposed of in a certain disposal canister.
ANNEX TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF CONCEPT FOR SAFEGUARDING
THE SPENT FUEL ENCAPSULATION PLANT IN FINLAND
Figure A-1. A safeguards scheme of the disposal process based on
the option where the encapsulation plant is built adjacent to the
Olkiluoto store away from the reactor (KPA) and the verification
measurements performed at the Olkiluoto and Loviisa spent fuel
stores. The containment and surveillance (C/S), unannounced in-
spections (UI) and complementary access (CA) are applied to the
whole final disposal chain.
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These conditions imply that each shipping of as-
semblies to the encapsulation plant should be
planned well in advance. An annual plan, quarter-
ly and monthly updates can be envisioned to facili-
tate also safeguards implementation, including ad-
vance notification about the accountancy verifica-
tion campaigns at the wet interim storages of the
Nuclear Power Plants.
2 Design aspects of final
characterisation and verification
No general safeguards approach exists for the fi-
nal disposal facility. Until the final disposal a per-
manent feature of the nuclear material under safe-
guards is that it always can be re-verified when
needed. This feature does not apply for the final
disposal. The nuclear material will no more be
available for safeguards verification purposes af-
ter its disposal into the final repository.
A verification measurement station is the cor-
nerstone of the final disposal safeguards system.
The  safeguards concept foresees a requirement of
rod level verification, i.e. the measurement should
be able to distinguish each rod in the assembly
and, additionally, to be able to distinguish an
irradiated spent fuel rod from a dummy. After the
verification the function of the safeguards is to
maintain the continuity of knowledge. In planning
the safeguards system, the aim is that the whole
disposal process would be optimized to be safe,
effective and efficient. Owing to that the final
verification measurement station should be inte-
grated to serve the disposal process as a whole.
The final disposal facility consists of an encap-
sulation plant and an underground repository.
They will be designed concurrently. Posiva has
started to design two encapsulation plant options.
Depending on the design, the encapsulation plant
either is associated with the wet interim storage
facility of the Olkiluoto NPP (Olkiluoto KPA Store)
or will be constructed apart from the KPA Store.
In the latter option the encapsulation plant would
be attached to the repository. The preferred design
will be selected as the basis of further work. [4, 5]
2.1 Verification gate
The most practical and possibly also the most eco-
nomical option seems to be to build the verifica-
tion station in both interim storage facilities
(Figure A-1). Both the BWR and the VVER assem-
blies could be verified at their present site and
MBA. This option would, however, require setting
up two final verification systems for the assem-
blies.
If the encapsulation plant were built adjacent
to the Olkiluoto KPA Store, the encapsulation
plant and the KPA Store would form a building
complex with an interim storage part and an
encapsulation part. For the verified BWR assem-
blies to be disposed of, there would be one transfer
route from the interim storage to the encapsula-
tion part of the complex. The only possible way to
transfer the assemblies from the KPA Store to the
encapsulation plant would be through the strate-
gic point i.e. the verification gate. Only the regular
cases would pass the verification gate and be
moved on to the encapsulation plant.
Correspondingly the VVER assemblies could be
verified at the interim storage of the Loviisa NPP
(Loviisa KPA Store), where another verification
gate should be built between the storage area and
the shipment terminal. The verified fuel assem-
blies could be loaded directly into the shipping
containers, which could be sealed and stored tem-
porarily to wait for the transportation to the
encapsulation plant.
2.2 Verification measurements in water
The verification measurements and all handling
operations related to the measurements could be
performed in water. The present experience on all
types of underwater measurements subjected to
spent fuel is far more extensive than the experi-
ence on corresponding measurements in air. The
water would give radiation protection for the per-
sons involved in the disposal process. No heavy
radiation shields would have to be built. Because
water absorbs radiation originating from other
spent fuel assemblies the only requirement is that
the verification gate should be far enough from
them. Water also attenuates impacts should acci-
dents or mishandling of assemblies happen, e.g.
dropping of an assembly.
2.3 Regular and irregular cases
If the assembly passes the verification measure-
ment, it is called a “regular” assembly, and it will
be placed into a buffer storage designated exclu-
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sively for the verified regular assemblies. The buff-
er storage could be e.g. a transport cask. In the
buffer storage  a verified batch destined to certain
disposal canisters will be collected for the next
shipment. Only the regular spent fuel assemblies
would be transported to the encapsulation plant.
The potentially irregular cases make addition-
al demands for the verification process. The irreg-
ularities would have to be solved in an effective
and efficient way. The irregular cases cannot pass
the gate and be transferred to the encapsulation
plant. This would call for a storage place specially
designated for these assemblies. The storage for
irregular cases might be arranged in a specific
rack in one of the storage ponds. Safeguards plans
have to take into consideration how, where and
when the irregularities would be solved. A substi-
tutive assembly should be found for the irregular
assembly. To minimise the interruptions in the
disposal process a buffer storage for substitutive
assemblies would be essential in the interim stor-
age. The substitutive assemblies must have been
verified earlier to be regular. Additionally, the
residual power limitations, as discussed in Sec. 1,
must be observed when choosing a substitutive
assembly for an irregular one.
2.4 Effective and efficient disposal process
The verification measurements could be per-
formed at the KPA Store in parallel with the en-
capsulation operations at the encapsulation plant.
When one batch is in the encapsulation process,
the next batch could be in the verification process.
Especially maintenance operations of the verifica-
tion station or a finding of an irregular case would
not interrupt the whole disposal process. This
would save time and make the whole disposal
process more effective and efficient. It is also very
important from the safeguards point of view to
perform the final verification in good time before
the assembly goes into the encapsulation phase.
The regular assemblies would be stored in a
buffer storage for one month before the shipment
for encapsulation. When needed, the safeguards
authorities would have one month of time to
respond to the verification results of the assem-
blies before their shipment into the encapsulation
plant.
3 Maintaining the continuity of
knowledge
After the final verification a reliable C/S system
would be needed to maintain the continuity of
knowledge. This system would include instrumen-
tal presence and institutional action in situ.
After closing and sealing at the encapsulation
plant, reopening of a disposal canister for safe-
guards purposes will not be allowed. The continui-
ty of knowledge would be ensured with overlap-
ping systems with different operation principles.
The failure of one system should not lead to a
broken continuity of knowledge. In the safeguards
point of view one of the key issues is that the C/S
system should be capable of preserving the conti-
nuity of knowledge in all situations. This would
imply that information about any failure, or possi-
ble failure, in the system function would reach the
Party who need to know in a timely manner.
Decontamination processes and handling of
empty canisters as well as radioactive waste gen-
erated in the disposal process should be safe-
guarded. Credible assurance that spent fuel is not
diverted through the various handling routes or
among the waste should be obtained.
In addition to safeguards controls, the opera-
tor’s monitoring and control systems, aimed at
production control, process control, radiation mon-
itoring, release and dose control and access con-
trol, could be of use also for safeguards purposes.
These activities could be used to facilitate comple-
mentary measures that are aimed at confirming
the declared operations and at making possible
early detection of indications of any undeclared
nuclear materials and activities.
The production and process control activities
primarily serve radiation and nuclear safety or
security and societal purposes. Their possible role
in safeguards should be studied more carefully.
The present technology allows a fully automated
computerized C/S system, which checks the seals
for tampering attempts, records the ID number of
the transport cask, reads and records the ID
number of each assembly to be unloaded from the
transport cask and subsequently loaded into the
disposal canister. Also the ID number of the dis-
posal canister and its lids can be registered. This
system could be connected into the accountancy
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database. A basic tool of the C/S system would be
an event register, which would register all events
equipped with their date and time stamps. Every
event would trigger a due recording in the materi-
al accountancy database. All recordings of the
process and radiation monitoring systems could
also be stored in the event register. Also all events
recorded in the physical protection and security
system could be registered in this event register.
Should there be any need to track the events
afterwards, all events would be available for solv-
ing any question whether it regards a technical
problem in the process, a safety problem or any
question regarding the safeguards or physical pro-
tection of the facility.
4 Conclusion
Based on the presented contemplation, the final
verification station in the Olkiluoto KPA store and
in Loviisa respectively seems to be a feasible op-
tion. The C/S and monitoring technology to sup-
port the maintenance of the established knowl-
edge is understood to be available. The same can
be stated about the information and communica-
tion technology. However, in addition to identifica-
tion, further development work is required to en-
sure effective application and implementation.
At this stage, the following particular issues
are identified for further consideration:
• Measurement station and required NDA tech-
nology to be applied at Olkiluoto and Loviisa
KPA Stores.
• C/S and monitoring technology to control trans-
portation of the spent fuel assemblies.
• The use of the encapsulation plant control
room functions and recordings also for the
safeguards monitoring, particularly to monitor
the encapsulation process.
• The role and use of the process control corridor
providing visual access to the hot cell and
canister transfer corridor.
• Use of the exhaust air monitoring system for
safeguards purposes.
• Monitoring of the contamination of various
premises and materials and monitoring of the
direct radiation at strategic points like the lift
entrance to the underground repository.
• Monitoring the material transfers from the hot
cell to the decontamination and monitoring the
work in the area of decontamination.
• Monitoring of the bentonite block production,
which is not supervised from the control room.
The personnel transfer the blocks to the canis-
ter lift. These transfers to the final repository
are interfering with the handling of the canis-
ters.
• The role of weight monitoring should be inves-
tigated.
• Use of hot cell manipulators for collecting envi-
ronmental samples for safeguards purposes
from the hot cell structure and equipment.
• Use of the drainage water system for collecting
environmental samples for safeguards purpos-
es.
• Monitoring the radioactive waste produced by
the encapsulation and decontamination. The
radioactive waste will be stored in the final
repository, in the cavern close to the canister
shaft bottom. The canister lift will be used and
the operation is interfering with the handling
of the canisters.
• Connection of the process, safety, security con-
trol systems and the safeguards C/S systems
into a common event register. The register
would be available for all Parties involved for
tracking of any event or any sequence of events,
which might have significance in assuring on
the maintenance of the safeguards objectives
or solving any question raised by any Party.
The above listed activities are of interest to safe-
guards, some of them particularly when consider-
ing the complementary access regime aimed at
assuring that no undeclared nuclear activities and
materials are present at any given time within the
site and facilities associated with the encapsula-
tion and final repository of spent fuel.
In addition, cooperation and coordination shall
be supported with the appropriate technology and
procedures to facilitate data and information col-
lection and distribution, knowledge creation and
sharing on need to know basis. Further work is
required to identify and develop the required
applications.
5 Future issues
Research and development activities concerning
the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland
are continued at the Olkiluoto site after the Deci-
sion in Principle made by the Government of Fin-
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land in December 2000 and ratified by the Parlia-
ment of Finland in May 2001.
Posiva is expected to present a detailed de-
scription of the final disposal facility at the end of
2003. The encapsulation plant design approach,
whether attached to the interim storage or to the
final disposal site, will have influence on the
safeguards plans. The technical plan for arranging
the nuclear material safeguards has to be included
in the detailed encapsulation plant designs.
According to Posiva’s schedule the application
for construction permit should be submitted in
2010. Then the technical plan for arranging the
nuclear material safeguards has to be complete.
This emphasises importance of integrating the
safeguards planning to the overall disposal facility
planning. Because Posiva will begin with the site
characterisation investigations, including the con-
struction of an underground shaft, the ‘Onkalo’,
already in 2004, the planning and required devel-
opment work also in the safeguards area is due.
Posiva and Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste
Management Company (SKB) have agreed to co-
operate in the research and technology field of the
final disposal of spent fuel. The goal of both
companies is the final disposal of spent fuel in the
bedrock. Posiva and SKB can optimise their activi-
ties by cooperating and by exchanging informa-
tion. Expenses can be cut down by avoiding over-
lapping operations. Cooperation between Posiva
and SKB might optimise also the design work of
the safeguards system. Both safeguards systems
will probably have common features, which could
be implemented in the same way even if the
encapsulation plant will be individual in each
country. Cooperation may be also a trap hole in
some sense. Should the schedule of either Posiva
or SKB be drawn out, it could jeopardise also the
schedule of the other partner.
 The requirements of the safeguards are under de-
velopment. The most economical solution to imple-
ment the safeguards system in the year 2020 is by
maintaining the design of the safeguards system
up-to-date to meet the developments through reg-
ular updates until the final disposal starts. The
aim is that the whole disposal process is optimised
to be safe, effective and efficient. [6]
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